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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LUDWIG OSTERTAG,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

DUNCAN G. LaMONT,
Defendant and Appellant,
DAVID LaMONT, a minor by
MARJORIE LaMONT, his Guardian
Ad Litem
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 8983

vs.

LUDWIG OSTERTAG,
Def,endant and Respondent,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

FACTS
Counsel for Respondent feels the facts are not correctly
stated by Appellants, and that an enlargement on said facts
is in order.
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On May 19, 1958, at about the hour of 9:30 P.M.,
Respondent Ludwig Ostertag was in his front yard at 1470
South 3rd East, in Salt Lake City, watering his lawn. It was
dark, hut Respondent noticed four boys proceeding South
on third East on the West side of the street, on the same side
as Respondent's home. Before the boys, one of whom was
Appellant, David LaMont, reached Respondent's premises,
they crossed over to the East side of the street, and when
directly opposite Ludwig Ostertag, one or more of the boys
(T-156, 158) threw rocks at Respondent, one of which hit
him in the hack of the neck and the other at his feet (T-90).
Now there had been a long series of abuses and attacks upon
Respondent and his property by Appellant, David LaMont
and other boys in company with David, (T-85, 86, 87, 88,
89, 92, 148-28, 158-17, 206). Respondent, therefore put
down his hose and walked after the boys, who had again
crossed back to the West Side of the street after they had
proceeded past the Ostertag home. Two of the boys began
to run, but Respondent was able to approach David LaMont,
and in broken English inquired why these boys wanted to
make trouble. David LaMont conveniently says he doesn't
remember anything that happened at that point (T-205),
but the facts quite clearly point up that Mr. Ostertag made
an attempt to reach out and apprehend the boy, (T-93, 154-5).
but David LaMont, in trying to turn and run away, slipped
and fell and then as he quickly got up to run again, he
stumbled head first into a ditch where he scratched and cut
his face (T-154-30, 155-8, 203-9). The LaMont boy and
the others ran West on Kensington Avenue and decided to
go about a half mile out of their way to one of the other
boy's homes, since David LaMont was fearful about going
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into his own house because of the trouble he had been in
before with the Ostertags, (T-155-20, 184).
Later that same night, after the boys had spread the
story among some of their parents that Respondent had
brutally attacked and beaten David LaMont, the boys,
together with one Veston Coleman, returned to the Ostertag
premises, the police were called, and Appellant, Duncan
LaMont, the father of David LaMont was summoned. When
Duncan LaMont arrived in his car, he jumped out, ran onto
Respondent's property, and without inquiring into the facts,
assaulted and battered Respondent in a malicious and revengeful manner, (T-99, 114, 209-6, 212-21). Respondent
received a fractured rib, lacerations of the face, body bruises,
loosened front teeth, a broken dental plate, and other considerable pain and suffering, (T-99, 100, 159, 161). He
also was prevented from working for a time, and suffered
about $650.00 loss in wages as a result, ( T -102, 103).
Respondent then brought an action against Appellant,
Duncan LaMont, claiming general and exemplary damages.
Subsequently, David LaMont brought action against Respondent claiming general and exemplary damages. These
two actions were later consolidated, although counsel for
Respondent had opposed Appellant's motion for the consolidation, (T-12, 14). Judgment was found in favor of Respondent and damages awarded, from which award appellants
have taken this appeal.

FIRST ACTION
LUDWIG OSTERTAG

vs.

DUNCAN LaMONT
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT

EXCESSIVE.
2. THE VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF PASSION
AND PREJUDICE.
3. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE
PROPER.

SECOND ACTION
DAVID LaMONT

vs.

LUDWIG OSTERTAG

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. DAVID LaMONT WAS NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT ON

THE QUESTION OF MEDICAL EXPENSE.

ARGUMENT
Point I

THE EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT
EXCESSIVE.
Counsel for Appellants has tried to make a point of
hearsay comments of a couple of jury members in arguing
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that $860.00 exemplary damages is excessive. Counsel for
Respondent submits that such argument is not proper nor
is it material to this Appeal. There is much weighty evidence
in this case for the jury to make a substantial award in exemplary damages. Defendant Duncan LaMont's own testimony at the trial showed his extremely revengeful and malicious attitude in this terrible act. One apparent reason that
the Jury chose to award greater exemplary damages rather
than obviously deserved compensatory damages was the vindictive attitude of Appellant in his testimony and the use
of exemplary damages as a deterrent to such actions as instructed by the Court (T-61). Counsel's question to Duncan
LaMont on cross examination was: "Mr. LaMont, did you
go and strike Mr. Ostertag for revenge?" His answer came
back quickly, angrily and vindictively, "/ sure did! I sure
did!" (T-209-6).
Contrary to Appellant's argument that the Court refused
to allow defendant Duncan LaMont to show the jury that his
child, David, had been punished because of his prior abuses
toward Respondent, the testimony shows that David LaMont
was definitely punished by his father for his previous acts,
( T -202-l 0). Further, if there was any misconception of the
facts, we submit that it was Appellant's own doing by insisting that the two actions be consolidated and tried as one,
and in view of the very apparent inconsistancies of Appellant's own witnesses, the four boys, as they testified.
The jury chose to believe, and rightly so from the evidence, that Respondent had not brutally beaten David LaMont, as was claimed, and that there was not sufficient provocation for the defendant, Duncan LaMont, to mercilessly beat
up Respondent and thus be exempt from punitive damages.
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It is true that the actual damages awarded by the jury
were considerably less than the exemplary damage award.
This does not mean, however, that there was not actually
more damage in the compensatory class sustained by Respondent. In fact, the evidence quite clearly points this out
(T-99, 100, 159, 161). Consequently there is a reasonable
relation between the actual and the exemplary damages.
Counsel for Appellant has cited Evans v. Gaisford in
support of his argument, but a study of that case will show
it supports Respondent's position, and the quotation rendered is not the Court's finding or conclusion at all.
Our Supreme Court has set down no definite measure
in this regard, but has pointed out a general rule or two
which counsel feels fully justifies this Court now in affirming the trial Court. In Falkenberg vs. Neff, 269 P. 1008,
the court, in upholding a punitive award of $1,500.00 where
the actual damages were only $362.50 said:
"There is no definite basis upon which the amount
can be computed, but there must necessarily be a limit
to the amount which may be awarded. It is the general rule that the award should not be disproportionate to the actual damage sustained, or should bear
some relation to the injury complained of."
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that there were more
actual damages sustained than was awarded by the jury.
In the case of Finney vs. Lockhart (Calif.) 217 P2nd 19,
where $2,000.00 exemplary damages was not considered
excessive and where only one dollar general damages was
awarded, the court said:
"That the verdict implied a finding that the plaintiff had sustained actual damages, and that the fact
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that only nominal damages were awarded in the
compensatory class did not necessarily imply a finding that no more actual damages were sustained."
We submit, therefore, that the jury's verdict of even
·$2,000.00 exemplary damages in this case was not excessive
under the circumstances, so especially in view of the trial
court's reduction of said damages to $860.00, the award
is not excessive.
Further, we suggest that the amount of punitive damages should be left to the sound discretion of the jury and
trial Court, as further point~d out in the Neff case above
~ited, and in 35 ALR 2nd 310, Section 2.
See also, in support of Respondent's position the following cases: Evans vs. Gaisford, 247 P2nd 431; Calkins vs.
Engle, 300 S.W. 997 (cited in the Gaisford case); Thompson
vs. Aldrich, et al, 297 P2nd 226.
Point II
THE VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF PASSION
AND PREJUHICE.
Counsel for Appellants argues that Respondent paraded
before the jury that life had been made intolerable for him
and his family by Appellant, David LaMont, and other boys.
Counsel is hardly in a position to have insisted on the two
actions being tried together, knowing that Ludwig Ostertag
would have to defend by showing the abuses against him
by David LaMont and other boys in company and consort
with him, and then, because the jury found in favor of
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Respondent, claim there was passion and prejudice by reason of the actions of the very boy who had sued Ostertag.
Further, counsel for Appellants, in his own cross examination of Ludwig Ostertag brought out the fact that
Ostertags had lost everything, and had no money, and found
it necessary to return back to Germany to be free from their
troubles here, ( T -110-7) .
A careful examination of the transcript involving Mr.
Ostertag's testimony will disclose a difficult time was had
because of the language barrier, and Mr. Ostertag's inability
to understand and speak the English language, and even
though an interpreter was found to be necessary by the Court,
every phrase and word, which would normally not be a problem, could present some difficulty in the translation and
communication. Yet, it is pointed out, that even though
the word "they" was sometimes used in the translation, it
was quite clear that David LaMont was involved in each of
the disrespectful and delinquent acts testified to, although he
never seemed to do these things alone. This however, had
nothing to do with the jury's determination of the issues
against Duncan LaMont, but only as it affected the boy,
David LaMont's, case and his right to punitive damages.
We submit, therefore, that the jury duly deliberated in
this matter and was not moved upon by passion and prejudice,
but properly, in accordance with the Court's instructions
(T-48) and because of the extremely malicious and revengeful act and attitude of defendant, Duncan LaMont, awarded
exemplary damages against him.
Point III
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
WERE PROPER.
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Respondent will argue Appellant's Points III, IV, and V
in one point.
The question of punitive damages and how it should
be treated by the jury in connection with both plaintiffs
in this trial was clearly and adequately expressed to the jury
by the trial court's instruction 9 through 12 (T-47, 48, 49).
The Court said in instruction 9, {T-47):
"Such acts as you find from a preponderance of the
evidence to have been committed may be considered
in determining whether or not punitive damages
should be awarded, and, if so, the amount thereof."
Again in instruction l 0 ( T -48) the Court said:
"However, the jury is not obligated to award punitive damages in any case, and they should be awarded
only if you feel that an award of actual damages
sustained by Mr. Ostertag against Mr. LaMont is
not a sufficient deterrent to prevent a repetition of
such an assault or is not a sufficient warning to other
people who might be tempted to do the same thing.
In no event can punitive damages be awarded unless
the act was done in a wanton, reckless, or vicious and
uncalled for manner."
We submit, therefore, that defendant's requested instruction numbers 4, 5, and 6, were given in substance, and
that to have given the instructions verbatim as counsel argues
should have been done, would have been improper. Respondent at no time admitted injuring David LaMont ( T -93-9),
and the evidence shows rather conclusively that any injuries
received by David LaMont were from his fall in the gutter
face down (T-203-9), and from his own doing. It was
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also very dark when Duncan LaMont came upon the property
of the Ostertags and, without any hesitation at all, he commenced his attack upon Respondent, (T-114-11, 98-29).
In defendant's requested instruction number 4 (T-36),
he states:
" ... while such is not justification for an attack upon
the plaintiff Ludwig Ostertag, you may, nevertheless,
consider such as provocation in the mitigation of any
damages, if any, that were sustained by the plaintiff,
Ludwig Ostertag ... "
In 4 American Jurisprudence, Page 204, Section 165,
it states:
"The better rule and weight of authority, however,
are in favor of the proposition that actual or compensatory damages are not subject to mitigation by proof
of mere provocation or malice."
Again in Section 166 of the same citation:
"If the assault is made after time for reflection and
under circumstances leading to the presumption that
it was for revenge, the assailant stands in the position
of an original trespasser, and the conduct of the other
party will not serve as an extenuation or in mitigation
of damages."
The evidence is conclusive that Duncan LaMont acted
for revenge (T-209-6). The Court, therefore, did properly
instruct the jury in this matter, and even had defendant requested an instruction on mitigation of punitive damages,
which he did not, the Court's instructions to the jury would
still have been proper under the circumstances.
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SECOND ACTION
DAVID LaMONT

vs.

LUDWIG OSTERTAG

DAVID LaMONT WAS NOT DENIED ANY RIGHT
ON THE QUESTION OF MEDICAL EXPENSE.
The introduction in evidence of the medical expenses of
David LaMont were received, without objection, from counsel
for Respondent and duly considered by the jury, (T-208).
The jury was also properly instructed as to damages as shown
in the Court's instruction number 12. Appellant's contention
that the Court instructed the jury that they could not consider this an element of damages is not supported by the
record and is untrue.
The fact that although the jury found that a battery had
been committed by Ostertag in the touching of David LaMont,
but awarded no damages for said battery, would indicate
that the jury felt the boy's injuries were not the proximate
result of said battery, therefore, no damages or medical
expenses would be awarded. Moreover, it is Respondent's
contention that there has been no violation nor infringement
of Appellant's rights in this matter that could justify a new
trial.

CONCLUSION
Certainly it is a black mark on this community and
America when such a family as Ostertags must find it necessary to return back to their homeland, Germany, to free
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themselves of such experiences of persecution in this free
land, and while we do not wish to imply that the Court
should not consider every facet in this case as to justice
and fairness, we do wish to comment that justice ends with
this Court on this Appeal as far as Respondent is concerned.
Surely, therefore, from a careful analysis of this case,
this Honorable Court will find that the parties hereto have
. had their day in court, and we strongly urge that every
consideration should be given to upholding the trial Court
and jury in their deliberations and judgment in this cause,
and thus rectify, at least in some measure, the terrible wrong
done to Respondent and his family.
Counsel for Respondent respectfully requests this Court
to affirm the decision of the trial Court with costs to
Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
CHILD, SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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